Browser fingerprinting tor

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Как это поможет идентифицировать пользователя? У вас здесь возникает вопрос: как это тоже помогает идентифицировать? Неожиданное для меня было исследование, которое я отыскал. Оно говорит о том, что прорисовка шрифтов, в частности, в Canvas API, чрезвычайно платформозависима.

Снаружи схожие схожие изображения, нарисованные в различных браузерах, будут преобразованы в различный байтовый массив. Это зависит от процессора, видеокарты, драйверов видеокарты, системных библиотек, таковых как direct X, систем отрисовки шрифтов, теней — все это на каждом компе может быть свое, потому результирующий байтовый массив будет различаться фактически на каждом компе, где будет различная аппаратная и программная внутренность.

И эта длинноватая строчка, приобретенная при сериализации Сanvas будет присоединена к итоговому отпечатку, и мы получим гигантскую строчку. Здесь показано, как это работает. Мы получаем все эти данные. Позже мы передаем их в функцию хэширования, в FingerprintJS употребляется nomo hash2 , и на выходе мы получаем х битное число. Это и есть ваш идентификатор. Этот номер вы считываете и используете, как желаете, — вы базируете на нем свою аналитику и т.

Здесь вопрос: как неповторимо и точно определение? Исследование, за базу которого было взято, было изготовлено компанией Electronic Frontier Foundation, у их был проект Panopticlick. Библиотеку стало применять много людей и компаний, и с течением времени выявился ряд недочетов. Потому, проанализировав все это, а на данный момент я тоже использую FingerprintJS, я пришел к выводу, что пора разрабатывать новейшую библиотеку, которая будет фактически лишена всех имеющихся недочетов. Как она решает имеющиеся проблемы?

Самое основное — употребляется фазихэширование либо localsensitivehash, либо нечеткое хэширование. Такое хэширование, которое не изменяется, даже ежели в обыкновенном хэшировании, ежели вы измените хотя бы один б входящей инфы, выходящая строчка тоже поменяется, при этом кардинальным образом. В фазихэшировании этого не происходит, здесь есть порог чувствительности, когда определенный процент входящих данных может поменяться, что не воздействует на исходящий отпечаток.

2-ое — в FingerprintJS 2 употребляется определение установленных шрифтов, всех шрифтов, которые установлены в системе. Чем это полезно? Ежели вы поставили програмку, допустим, adobe pdf, то вы добавляете в систему шрифты.

Ежели вы поставили Microsoft Office, вы добавляете в систему шрифты; ежели вы поставили какой-либо Quick office, который имеет собственные шрифты, вы снова же добавляете в систему шрифты. И потому у вас может быть два полностью схожих компа, но на одном установлен Office, а на другом — нет. Это означает, что на первом, где нет Office, будет доступных шрифтов, а, где есть Office — шрифтов.

И означает, что вы можете получить все шрифты, которые есть на этом компе, снова же, для итогового отпечатка. Это будет два различных отпечатка, поэтому что шрифты различные. По умолчанию употребляется Flash, небольшой swf файл размером б Он получает перечень всех установленных шрифтов, при этом в платформозависимом порядке, так как они доступны в системе, так они и будут возвращены.

Ежели Flash не установлен, употребляется таковая техника, она именуется site chanel technic. Она в первый раз была размещена на веб-сайте lalit. Это определение наличия шрифта с помощью javascript only. Как это делается? Для каждого референтного шрифта, который задан по умолчанию в браузере либо в системе, измеряется его ширина и высота, и этот массив ширины и высоты сохраняется.

Потом к сокрытому тексту текст, кстати, большой, допустим, 72 пикселя применяется иной шрифт. Ежели этот шрифт есть в системе, текст изменит свои габариты верно, и код, который изменяет высоту и ширину, получит новейший массив, с высотой и шириной. Ежели он различается от референтного, от того, который был получен при запросе дефолтного шрифта, означает, этот шрифт установлен. Ежели не различается, означает, этого шрифта нет.

Чрезвычайно обычная мысль, но она работает. На данный момент этот код может достоверно найти около шрифтов без использования Flash. И, соответственно, тот комп, где есть Microsoft Office, и тот, где его нет, будут по-разному определены в FingerprintJS 2 за счет данной техники. Третье отличие — WebGL Fingerprint. Это развитие идеи Сanvas Fingerprint. Сущность его заключается в том, что рисуются 3D треугольники на слайде не чрезвычайно отлично видно, но это 3D.

На него накладываются эффекты, градиент, различная анизотропная фильтрация и т. И потом он преобразуется в байтовый массив. Результирующий байтовый массив, как и в случае с Canvas Fingerprint, будет различный на почти всех компах. Позже к этому байтовому массиву еще добавляется информация о платформозависимых константах, которые определены в WebGL.

Это глубина цвета, наибольший размер текстур… Этих констант чрезвычайно много, их 10-ки. Он опрашивает все эти константы, все это снова же складывается в большой массив, и все это добавляется к сериализованному изображению 3D треугольника, который нарисован при помощи аппаратных эффектов. Здесь тоже таковой вопрос: как это помогает идентифцировать? И когда оно будет преобразовано в байтовый массив, оно будет различное на почти всех компах.

Почему WebGl Fingerprint важен? Поэтому что IOS 8. Потому WebGL увеличивает точность Fingerprint. Как я говорил, библиотека находится в разработке и не все вещи, которые я бы желал в ней сделать, изготовлены. Вокруг нее уже есть маленькое общество разрабов. Я, кстати, приглашаю всех желающих участвовать в разработке — она чрезвычайно увлекательная, мы чрезвычайно неформальны, каждый дает идеи, там довольно любопытно. WebRTC — это эталон peer-to-peer коммуникаций через аудиопотоки, либо это эталон аудиокоммуникаций в современных браузерах.

Он дозволяет делать аудиозвонки и т. Реализация WebRTC эталона тоже платформозависима, она будет зависеть от той видеокарты, которая установлена в системе, от драйверов на звук и т. Потому, измеряя различные уровни латентности, различные уровни поддержки WebRTC и констант, которые зашиты в этом формате, можно получить различные итоговые отпечатки для различных компов.

Будет употребляться больше плагинов для IE. Будут применены те плагины, которые популярны в различных странах — Китае, Индии и т. В первой версии недостаточно внимания было уделено данной дилемме, а во 2-ой версии это будет решено. Больше инфы будет собираться о ОС. Как мы это будем делать? Будет употребляться интеграция с Flash и Silverlight. Flash дозволяет получать информацию о системе, такую как версия ядра, патч левел ядра.

Silverlight, ежели на Windows, дозволяет получить версию Windows, bild, номер Windows, все это доступно через Silverlight. Пару слов о Silverlight, почему интеграция с sliverlight тоже довольно важна? Может быть, в Рф Silverlight плагин не чрезвычайно популярен, но в США, к примеру, есть сервис стримингового видео Netflix, который передает видео, и я знаю точно, что они употребляют Silverlight.

Ввиду того, что он поддерживает DRM это система ограничения цифровых прав на контент , так как Netflix нередко демонстрируют различные свежайшие голливудские киноленты, они употребляют Silverlight для того, чтоб это видео не расходилось по Вебу. Будет реализовано определение наличия пары мониторов.

Ежели мы запросим размеры через javascript, то получим просто два числа — это ширина и высота экрана. Это означает, что ежели установлено несколько мониторов, где каждый подмассив — это будет размер экрана каждого монитора. Ежели разраб посиживает за пятью мониторами, он получит массив массивов из 5 частей, т. Но, как вы осознаете, это недостающая точность идентификации. Здесь встает вопрос: каким образом это можно сделать лучше, и можно ли это улучшить?

Я считаю, что можно. Не принципиально, все это будет определено. Обучающий курс. Browser Fingerprint — анонимная идентификация браузеров Валентин Васильев Machinio. Пару слов обо мне. Для что она используется? Для что мы желаем присвоить браузеру идентификатор? Мы желаем учесть наших юзеров. Мы желаем знать, пришел ли юзер к нам 1-ый раз, пришел он во 2-ой раз либо в 3-ий. Ежели юзер пришел во 2-ой раз, мы желаем знать, на какие странички он входил, что он до этого делал. С анонимными юзерами это нереально.

Ежели у вас есть система учета записей, юзер логинится, мы все про него знаем — мы знаем его учетную запись, его индивидуальные данные, мы можем привязать любые деяния к этому юзеру. Тут все просто. В случае с анонимными юзерами все становится еще труднее. 2-ой сценарий — индивидуальная реклама. Это на данный момент везде. Мы заходим, и вдруг нам демонстрируют рекламу каких-нибудь пирожков, которые мы желали приобрести еще вчера. Это делается через идентификацию юзеров. 3-ий сценарий — внутренняя аналитика.

Ежели вы используете, кроме Google Analytics либо Yandex, свою самописную систему аналитики, Fingerprint JS и Browser Fingerprint, в целом, может для вас посодействовать в достижении практически полной идентификации анонимных юзеров. Вы можете узреть, что юзер делал на вашем веб-сайте, на какие странички входил, какие ссылки он щелкал и т. И выстроить на базе этого целую картину, карту действий юзера. Все это достигается при помощи данной техники — Browser Fingerprinting.

Как программеры пробовали и пробуют решить эту проблему? Считывается часовой пояс, это количество минут от UTC: — Это —3, выходит Москва. Дальше выходит размер экрана, массив, глубина цвета экрана. Есть еще 2 метода, которые добавляют уникальности.

1-ый — это информация о плагинах. Код опрашивает наличие всех установленных плагинов в системе. Для каждого плагина выходит его описание и заглавие. А также, что чрезвычайно принципиально, перечень всех мультимедиа типов либо main типов, которые поддерживают этот плагин. Вся эта информация объединяется в большой массив строк, и этот массив тоже конкатенируется и прибавляется к строке отпечатка.

Как вы осознаете, на каждом компе перечень плагинов собственный, довольно неповторимый, и версии плагинов могут быть свои, и перечень поддерживаемых main типов тоже будет собственный. Схемы деанонимизации построены конкретно на идентификации браузера цели.

Так как способы идентификации браузера противоречат канонам общества Tor, создатели начали работу над решениями, препятствующими идентификации Tor, чтоб сохранить анонимность юзеров. Так в феврале года вышла версия Tor 5. Тем не наименее, специалисты отмечают наличие некоторой технологии идентификации, использующей особые коды JavaScript, которая способна различать браузер Tor.

Выходит, этот браузер уязвим для неких способов отслеживания. Браузер Tor защищен от большинства обыденных способов идентификации браузера. Но, как уже отмечалось выше, есть способ, называемый профессионалами Tor fingerprinting. Он возник благодаря тому, что исследователи чрезвычайно тщательно исследовали Tor, чтоб вычленить более соответствующие индивидуальности браузера. Исследователи указывают на то, что версию Tor можно получить, делая упор на выдаваемый браузером User Agent.

В версиях до 5. Способ Font. Но так как по умолчанию в Tor отключены плагины Flash, можно употреблять последующие меры для определения перечня шрифтов:. Эти способы будут работать в Tor 5. Сработает с Intel Pentium 4 и наиболее новенькими процессорами.

Выполнение томных вычислений с внедрением пары потоков в Web Workers API дозволяет подсчитать количество ядер процессора, а также найти наличие либо отсутствие технологии Hyper-threading. Частоту обновления и время отклика монитора можно найти с помощью способа requestAnimationFrame, при этом это пройдет с Tor 5. Таковым образом, они просто могут употребляться для идентификации браузера. Невзирая на все усилия Tor-сообщества сохранить анонимность юзеров, как мы можем созидать, все еще существует несколько проверенных способов, позволяющих точно найти, что юзер вышел в Сеть через Tor.

Ознакомившись с сиим материалом, вы, может быть, будете иметь на руках наиболее полную картину, а означает, можете сделать определенные меры, которые дозволят для вас сохранить конфиденциальность. Внедрение материалов веб-сайта с полной копией оригинала допускается лишь с письменного разрешения администрации. Все права защищены. Перейти к основному содержанию.

Это было браузер тор что там есть hydraruzxpnew4af считаю

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Today, there is no ultimate solution to fix browser fingerprinting. As its origin is rooted in the beginning of the internet, there is no single patch that can fix it for good. And as such, designing defenses is hard. A lot of approaches have been tried and evaluated over the years with each their strengths and weakness.

Examples include blocking attributes, introducing noise, modifying values, or increasing fingerprint diversity. However, one important observation that has been made is that sometimes having no specific defense is better than having one. Some solutions, because of the way they were designed or coded, remove some fingerprinting vectors but introduce some artifacts or inconsistencies in the collected fingerprints. For example, imagine a browser extension that changes the value of fingerprints before they are sent.

Everything works perfectly except the fact that the developer forgot to override the navigator. Because of this, the user-agent may say that the browser is running on Windows whereas the platform still indicates it is on a Linux system. This creates a fingerprint that is not supposed to exist in reality and, as such, make the user more visible online. To identify websites who use browser fingerprinting, one can simply turn to privacy policies. Another way of identifying websites using fingerprinting is to look directly at the scripts that run in the browser.

The problem here is that it can be challenging to differentiate a benign script that is here to improve the user experience from a fingerprinting one. For example, if a site accesses your screen resolution, is it to adjust the size of HTML elements to your screen or is it the first step in building a fingerprint of your device? The line between the two can be very thin and identifying fingerprinting scripts with precision is still a subject that has not been properly studied yet.

One use of fingerprinting that is lesser known is for bot detection. To secure their websites, some companies rely on online services to assess the risk associated with external connections. In the past, most decisions to block or accept a connection was purely based on IP reputation. Now, browser fingerprinting is used to go further to detect tampering or identify signs of automation. On the defensive side, more and more browser vendors are adding fingerprinting protection directly in their browser.

As mentioned previously in this blog post, Tor and Firefox are at the forefront of these efforts by limiting passive fingerprinting and blocking active fingerprinting vectors. Since its initial release, the Brave browser also includes built-in protection against it.

Apple made changes to Safari in to limit it and Google announced in May its intention to do the same for Chrome. Browser fingerprinting has grown a lot over the past few years. As this technique is closely tied to browser technology, its evolution is hard to predict but its usage is currently shifting. What we once thought could replace cookies as the ultimate tracking technique is simply not true.

Recent studies show that, while it can be used to identify some devices, it cannot track the mass of users browsing the web daily. Instead, fingerprinting is now being used to improve security. More and more companies find value in it to go beyond traditional IP analysis.

They analyze the content of fingerprints to identify bots or attackers and block unwanted access to online systems and accounts. One big challenge surrounding fingerprinting that is yet to be solved is around the regulation of its usage. For cookies, it is simple to check if a cookie was set by a specific website. Anyone can go in the browser preferences and check the cookie storage.

For fingerprinting, it is a different story. There is no straightforward way to detect fingerprinting attempts and there are no mechanisms in a browser to completely block its usage. From a legal perspective, this is very problematic as regulators will need to find new ways to cooperate with companies to make sure that the privacy of users is respected.

Finally, to finish this post, is fingerprinting here to stay? In the near future at least, yes. This technique is so rooted in mechanisms that exist since the beginning of the web that it is very complex to get rid of it. It is one thing to remove differences between users as much as possible. It is a completely different one to remove device-specific information altogether. Only time will tell how fingerprinting will change in the coming years but its evolution is something to watch closely as the frantic pace of web development will surely bring a lot of surprises along the way.

Thanks a lot for reading this post all the way through! If you want to dive even deeper in the subject, I invite you to read the survey [11] on the topic that we recently made available online. Laperdrix, W. Rudametkin and B. Laperdrix, and B. Mowery, and H. In Web 2. Cao, S. Li, and E. Englehardt, and A. Van Acker, and A.

Starov, and N. Olejnik, G. Acar, C. Castelluccia, and C. Olejnik, S. Laperdrix, N. Bielova, B. Baudry, and G. However, the example was that some random user installs the extension and is now suddenly standing out even though they thought they would enhance their privacy. The Tor Browser case is different in that it is not just a single user behaving that way but all of the Tor Browser Linux users which should give cover against getting singled out.

Ideally, we would spood the JavaScript attributes as well, I agree. But there are usability concerns mostly on macOS that lead us to the current solution. Someone using Tor Browser is already willing to sacrifice usability for privacy, in many cases to much more extreme extent than not having websites detect their OS. Having to manually choose or hunt down proper OS version when doing something OS specific is a minuscule issue in comparison, as well as much more infrequent for most users.

I urge Tor Project to reassess these judgments in view of the latest revelations about dragnet attacks on a significant percentage of the so far living human population, this time apparently by China, together with the mounds of evidence that NSA is hardly a reformed character when it comes to their own vast "collect it all" dragnet surveillance programs. Specifically, it should be clear that those users who tried to warn for years that everyone is a target have been correct all along.

Which is obviously a crucial insight for making good decisions about trading off security viz. The most dangerous situations, wrt oppressive governments and increasingly, they are all oppressive to one degree or another arise when people falsely assume they enjoy protection, for example because they assume falsely that "ordinary citizens" are not targeted, or will not suffer dire consequences if a state-sponsored attack succeeds in trojaning their device.

You probably mean to say "Some Tor Browser users are willing If I do visit such a site, I use a different browser session. If that is not practical, why not? And in that case, does the number of Mac OS users who use TB really justify the risk to everyone else?

Loyal to a fault, I grab the opportunity to thank Richard Stallman and Linus Torvalds for their positive contributions to the welfare of all humans. Since I am one of those who criticize certain design decisions by Tor devs, I should perhaps say that this is one I happen to agree with. Tor Project cannot fix anything after it has happened, unfortunately. But you probably meant to ask whether a problem you experienced in has been addressed, and to the best of my knowledge, a good deal of attention has been paid in recent years owing in great part to vociferous user complaints!

Node location is less concerning than if padding and timing of packets were not made to appear similar, but they are. And nodes are shared by many users simultaneously, and each domain you visit goes through a different circuit. Many defenses are working in concert. However, nodes could run compromised software that negates some defenses.

But if you limit yourself from large groups of nodes as you build circuits, you affect other statistics of identifying your traffic. Tor benefits from more diversity in general. Letterboxing is black bars around video or images to fit in a different sized display. You will see it in Tor Browser soon because it helps to impede browser fingerprinting that detects your window resolution numbers. Results are worse if you enable JS slider at "safer" but bad even if you put slider to "safest".

How to interpret this? I think questions about the authors tool should be addressed in comments or in a followup. I was surprised that in TB8 dom. Firefox is a leaky boat and it seems some at Mozilla are working with a drill on new versions. Outright disabling a feature is just the last resort but luckily we can do better in that case.

Am I correct in guessing that your thinking here is that disabling a feature like DOM storage entirely would likely be noticeable by websites which could exploit this to more easily distinguish Tor Browser users from "ordinary FF"? But surely they can easily see from the IP that the visitor is coming from a Tor exit node? Cannot Tor Project bring back Pierre Laperdrix for a followup explaining why he guesses Tor users are reporting the "almost unique" results from his fingerprinting test tool?

I hope that part of the answer would be that the results reported by this tool are based almost entirely upon non-Tor users, but no-one has actually stated that, and I have found through long experience that bad things happen when no-one bothers to ask or answer questions about thoughtless assumptions which might prove to be very incorrect.

I think I support the general goal of making Tor users hard to distinguish from others but only until almost everyone uses Tor for almost everything of course while also making it hard to distinguish individual Tor users from other Tor users, and I can see that this hard. So we are asking questions not to criticize, only just to know.

I am not concerned about "more easily" detecting Tor Browser users apart from Firefox users. There is probably no way to hide the former in the latter. The goal is to have a large as possible crowd of Tor Browser users being on the same Tor Browser version. Disabling things like DOM storage harms that goal in that this breaks functionality that leads users away from Tor Browser. Yes, Tor Browser users stand out compared to other browser users. Is there some reason that the Canvas Blocker extension is not installed by default?

It functions perfectly by default providing random hash codes for both DOMRect and canvas, leaving the user with total fingerprinting protection. We provide a proper defense by default in Tor Browser instead. My fingerprint signature, after refreshing the page, remains static. This mean I have been positively identified by the hash code.

Can you please elaborate how I am protected against fingerprinting when I have just proven otherwise? All Tor Browser users are sending the same value back by default. It might be useful to list some of the things we might have in mind when we say that we Tor users want to appear "just like the others". Off the top of my head:. Some other legit goals which might sometimes be hard to reconcile with at least some of the above:. Regarding canvas fingerprinting, some months ago I began to notice a weird icon appearing at many sites.

Eventually someone told me this is the canvas icon and that it appears when a website is asking permission to fingerprint your browser. Reading between the lines of what you wrote, I guess FF does not ask permission, it just silently gives up the fingerprinting data, whereas TB asks the user for permission.

But why on earth would a TB user say "yes"? Except by mistake? And what happens if the user fails to answer the question? After a timeout does TB assume that the user has given permission? I hope not, but I worry. In any case, until your statement I had no reason to think TB was actually blocking the fingerprinting, although I hoped this was the case. Which I admit TP mostly does not. Still, fingerprinting seems like such a basic topic and is essential to protect against to have any chance of meeting the anonymity goals which are driving more and more ordinary people to try Tor Browser.

One of the targeted sites is said to be youtube. Apple admitted that this appears to be true, but rather horrifyingly appeared to suggest that because the presumed targets were Uyghurs, "ordinary people" need not worry. I suspect this assumption on the part of Apple is flat out wrong, and in any case I hate the suggestion that Uyghurs are not people too.

Any comment? Do you know whether Debian is addressing problems which could cause trouble for Tails as they work to release Tails 4. What about the battery API issue? The HTML5 canvas feature allows a webpage to draw or animate images. Some pages draw features on the canvas that a user may want, but extraction of those images is different.

If the user fails to answer, Mike Perry said in that Firefox bug report, "In Tor Browser, we have opted to have the canvas return white image data until the user has accepted a doorhanger UI that flips a site permission to either enable or permanently block canvas access from that site. Why are you asking Tor Project about iOS and youtube?

Rather than asking Tor Project, ask individuals. Which debunks a false argument against using encryption, Tor, etc. Which debunks a false argument against using the best available defenses, such as Tails. The revelation which shocked the security world is that everyone who visited youtube. Any further light which can be shed upon the affair is potentially valuable information to Tor users seeking to assess the dangers we face.

I take the point about not wanting to introduce more third party and possibly buggy code than needed, but do I understand what Mike Perry as quoted elsewhere on this page said to mean that when current TB sees a website asking for canvas data, it returns a blank white canvas image and puts up a weird little icon which is intended to warn the user that the site attempted canvas fingerprinting, and if the user clicks on the weird little icon which is intended to suggest a "canvas", the dialog they see means that TB is assuming they want to prevent that site from canvas fingerprinting the user, but they have the option to allow this if for some reason they want to allow it.

While I have your attention, another issue which came up is that it is all too easy to accidently hit that tiny box which instantly maximizes the Tor Browser window game over. Would it be hard to simply disable that maximization box? I can see why a FF user might want to be able to maximize their browser with a click on a box, but surely not TB user would be want to do that on purpose?

Scroll through the source looking for suspicious URIs and hope to find none? Or something more? Tor Browser makes it easy maybe too easy to get in the habit of searching Duckduckgo engine rather than Google search engine. If you download and install Tor Browser, in the location pane where the url appears , try typing something which does not begin with http: or https: The browser interprets that as a search query and redirects it to Duckduckgo by default or to another search engine of your choosing, via tor circuits.

NSA has not stopped piggybacking on synchronized cookies mostly from Google or Facebook to track individuals using tor. You may have read some months ago fake news widely reported by the mainstream media, claiming that NSA was abandoning its web and phone metadata dragnets.

Synchronized cookies are considered metadata at NSA. But mainstream media mostly ignored that inconvenient truth. Too easy? Every major browser searches from the address bar. Pick your poison: DNS logs or search engine logs. One of the reasons why Google is so popular is because many browsers come installed configured to send all of your search queries to Google. It is always wonderful to see researchers who take the time to inform users about the state of the art.

Especially when the news is not bad! Years ago I recall A. Narayan claimed at his website to be in the process of fingerprinting every author who ever posted anything to the web using stylometry. I wonder whether you know what the current status of that is?

I hope that as with browser fingerprinting these claims have proven to be overstated. Arvind Narayanan co-authored a research paper in How much anonymity can be expecetd with Tor Browser on the low security setting? Is it even worth using at this point, or can every PC be easily distinguished anyways? But seriously, the extent to which everyone is lulled into giving up privacy for convenience or bureaucratic expectation is horrifying. Now we need to pressure developers to adopt it before those developers release new RFCs or proofs of concepts.

Great news. It seems that the TB team has abandoned some apparently useful things with no explanation, which I find frustrating as a user. One of these is relevant to the subject of this post:. Some time ago the TB team said TB would try to find a reasonable default size to avoid making users easily trackable because their screen size was essentially unique among Tor users owing to vagaries of the device on which they run TB. But recently I noticed that the standard sizes seem to have been abandoned, and when I checked the amiunique website this appears to confirm that very weird nonstandard window sizes are being used to fingerprint TB users.

We still round the window on start-up to a multiple of px x px. Nothing has changes here. What do you get with a clean, new Tor Browser on which operating system? Thanks for the reply. I am using Tails 3. How can I tell? The test site from Laperdrix showed a crazy value which would certainly be very unique. I also use Tor Browser 8. On the least diry one it does seem that TB is choosing some kind of standard size which fits in a x display.

The existing warning appears when the horse has already bolted from the stable, which is no help at all, agreed? That said, letterboxing is supposed to fix that we accidentally disabled it in 9. There is probably not much the TB team can do about onboard mikes included in almost any laptop, PC, or smart phone So why are the mikes enabled by default? Go to the Tails website. That is, many features are unavailable in Tor Browsers—based on our test, only the following features, notably our newly proposed, still exist, which include the screen width and height ratio, and audio context information e.

We believe that it is easy for Tor Browser to normalize these remaining outputs. If the user does allow canvas, she can still be fingerprinted. The Tor Browser document also mentions a unimplemented software rendering solution, however as noted in Section VI-D, the outputs of software rendering also differ significantly in the same browser.

We still believe that this is the way to pursue, but more careful analysis is needed to include all the libraries of software rendering. And I am confused he says "ratio" since the pair of values is obviously more dangerous in terms of fingerprinting. My concern is that my own TB window is being "clipped" by the desktop environment in Tails or Debian 10 as the case may be because for some reason the window is too big for the monitor, although AFAIK my monitors are vanilla.

It seems that GTK has somehow been hopelessly munged in Debian 10, which makes for example Synaptic the package manager very hard to use. If others confirm the issue this could cause unwanted headaches for Tails team as they prepare Tails 4. The default desktop environment in Debian is Gnome, which was once a great choice but almost no-one seems to like Gnome 3. A recent article suggests that Debian users should choose instead XFCE which indeed seems to be the workable solution for PCs, if you wish to avoid pulling in privacy-hostile "features" like user-behavior-trackers and geoclue which means Gnome and KDE are non-starters.

One worry going forward is that when Tails Project issues Tails 4. Although the potential privacy problems of the Battery Status API were discussed by Mozilla and Tor Browser developers as early as in , neither the API, nor the Firefox implementation, has undergone a major revision. We hope to draw attention to this privacy issue by demonstrating the ways to abuse the API for fingerprinting and tracking.

It seems that most of the popular Linux distros use Battery Status API which insanely reports the battery status to double precision, which almost seems to beg for dual-purposing this "innocuous" API for tracking. Has anyone tried to ask the developers of that API what they were thinking? But not the Tor Browser, as it attempts to maintain a uniform fingerprint across all devices.

Yes, and at one time TB team appeared to try to do something like that, but more recent versions of TB seem to be happy to let FF code give the browser a unique height and width. That is bad. Would it be possible to have TB report to users the current height and width so that they can to manually adjust the size to one of a small set of suggested values given for example in at www.

Having TB do this automatically would be much better, though, agreed? I am not sure what you mean with "unique height and width". H ave you ever heard of browser fingerprinting? Browser fingerprinting is an incredibly accurate method of identifying unique browsers and tracking online activity. Luckily, there are a few things you can do to wipe all of your fingerprints from the internet. Browser fingerprinting is defined on Wikipedia as follows:.

Fingerprints can be used to fully or partially identify individual users or devices even when cookies are turned off. That means that, when you connect to the internet on your laptop or smartphone, your device will hand over a bunch of specific data to the receiving server about the websites you visit.

Browser fingerprinting is a powerful method that websites use to collect information about your browser type and version, as well as your operating system, active plugins, timezone, language, screen resolution, and various other active settings. Panopticlick found that only 1 in , other browsers will share the same fingerprint as another user. Websites use the information provided by browsers to identify unique users and track their online behavior. The uniqueness of browser information is closely related to the investigation method of the police and forensic teams, who identify suspects and criminals based on fingerprints at the crime scene.

The Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System IAFIS is a massive database that stores fingerprints of 70 million subjects of criminal cases, as well as 31 million prints from civil cases. That means that a large chunk of these fingerprints were collected for analysis purposes. Browser fingerprinting works like that as well. Websites bulk-collect a large set of data of visitors in order to later use it to match against browser fingerprints of known users.

These groups have been formed by matching people based on browser fingerprinting. Now, you might be wondering: why is this being done, and why is your data so incredibly valuable to these companies? The international advertising industry and marketing machines love your data.

Tracking methods and data collection are extremely valuable because it allows advertising businesses to create a profile based on your data. The more data these businesses have, the more accurately they can target you with advertisements, which indirectly means higher revenue for the company.

Browser fingerprinting is also used to identify the characteristics of botnets because the connections of botnets are established by a different device every time. Such analysis could lead to the identification of fraudsters and other suspicious activities that require investigation. Also, banks use this method to identify potential fraud cases. By doing so, a hacker who logged into the account using a device that had never accessed the account before can potentially be identified.

All of these signs suggest potential fraud and usually trigger further investigation or the preventative freezing of an account. Websites use several different methods to track users on the internet. The technology allows websites to interact with your browser and retrieve information. A common way for websites to obtain your data is by using cookies. Cookies are small packets of text files that are stored on your computer, which contain certain data that may give websites information to improve the user experience.

Websites remember and track individual computers and devices by loading the cookies small data packets onto your computer. Every time you visit a website, your browser will download cookies. When you visit the same website at a later time, the website will assess the packets of data and provide you with a personally customized user experience. Think about the font size or screen resolution you view on a website.

Cookies also store data on browsing activity, habits, interests, and much more. Furthermore, websites employ Javascript, which will interact with visitors in order to carry out certain tasks, such as playing a video. These interactions also trigger a response, and as such, they receive information about you.

This new tracking method that websites employ to obtain your browser fingerprint is enabled by new coding features in HTML5. HTML5 is the coding language used to build websites. Wikipedia provides the following explanation on how exploiting the HTML5 canvas element generates browser fingerprinting :. Finally, the script takes the hash of the text-encoded pixel data, which serves as the fingerprint.

This information serves as the unique fingerprint of every visitor. I believe that many online privacy-minded people, like myself, are aware of the fact that covering up your IP address is an important method to use to hide your online identity.

The IP address protocol is designed to send a request to a receiving web server every time a user interacts with a website or service because the receiving server needs an IP address to send a response to. That means that your IP address is a unique string of numbers that points directly to your device. There are various tools available that make it possible to test your browser identity.

Am I Unique uses a comprehensive list of 19 attributes data points. You can also run a test with Panopticlick. Panopticlick also runs various tests to assess your browser identity. As shown in the analysis, the results are mixed. My browser is blocking certain items partially while not blocking other things at all.

This tracker concludes that my browser fingerprint is unique.

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I was thinking about coding a tiny python browser or another based on the chromium project, and just configure it not to pass that much data empty user agents, etc. The downside is I had to get a new IP for every fingerprint change to seem like requests came from different devices.

And the easiest way to achieve that is using Tor. But then I still have my unique fingerprint and back to the original problem, right? Does the Tor network do something about this? When you do not change anything, the Tor browser is already configured in a way that the fingerprint is identical to every other Tor browser and is close to the most common fingerprint on the web.

I recommend to rely on this instead of messing around with it by yourself since there are many possibilities to build a fingerprint. Have a look at the open and closed issues of the Tor browser bug tracker and try to understand the problems.

You could also use Tails via a read-only live medium to get a very high amount of anonymity with reasonable effort. The fingerprinting that could be used to identify a browser depends on what features are available. Then again, the lack of excessive data would also make your traffic more unique. In the end though, you are going to be opening yourself up a lot by having Javascript enabled.

If I accessed it with a Tor browser I got a notification from the browser that says:. Also, each time I renewed my identity and visited the fingerprinting URL it gave me a unique fingerprint based off screen resolution, so Tor seems to have anti-fingerprinting there as well. Javascript can reveal a lot of fingerprinting information.

It provides DOM objects such as window. In the future, new JavaScript features such as Resource Timing may leak an unknown amount of network timing related information. You would probably want to script regular changes to possible operating system identifiers such as exact time, keyboard layouts, MAC address. Sign up to join this community. The best answers are voted up and rise to the top. Stack Overflow for Teams — Collaborate and share knowledge with a private group. Create a free Team What is Teams?

Learn more. How well Tor protects against fingerprinting? Ask Question. Asked 5 years, 9 months ago. Active 4 years, 6 months ago. Viewed 8k times. Improve this question. All of these signs suggest potential fraud and usually trigger further investigation or the preventative freezing of an account.

Websites use several different methods to track users on the internet. The technology allows websites to interact with your browser and retrieve information. A common way for websites to obtain your data is by using cookies. Cookies are small packets of text files that are stored on your computer, which contain certain data that may give websites information to improve the user experience.

Websites remember and track individual computers and devices by loading the cookies small data packets onto your computer. Every time you visit a website, your browser will download cookies. When you visit the same website at a later time, the website will assess the packets of data and provide you with a personally customized user experience. Think about the font size or screen resolution you view on a website.

Cookies also store data on browsing activity, habits, interests, and much more. Furthermore, websites employ Javascript, which will interact with visitors in order to carry out certain tasks, such as playing a video. These interactions also trigger a response, and as such, they receive information about you.

This new tracking method that websites employ to obtain your browser fingerprint is enabled by new coding features in HTML5. HTML5 is the coding language used to build websites. Wikipedia provides the following explanation on how exploiting the HTML5 canvas element generates browser fingerprinting :. Finally, the script takes the hash of the text-encoded pixel data, which serves as the fingerprint.

This information serves as the unique fingerprint of every visitor. I believe that many online privacy-minded people, like myself, are aware of the fact that covering up your IP address is an important method to use to hide your online identity. The IP address protocol is designed to send a request to a receiving web server every time a user interacts with a website or service because the receiving server needs an IP address to send a response to. That means that your IP address is a unique string of numbers that points directly to your device.

There are various tools available that make it possible to test your browser identity. Am I Unique uses a comprehensive list of 19 attributes data points. You can also run a test with Panopticlick. Panopticlick also runs various tests to assess your browser identity. As shown in the analysis, the results are mixed. My browser is blocking certain items partially while not blocking other things at all. This tracker concludes that my browser fingerprint is unique. Perhaps new software or other ways to sufficiently combat browser fingerprinting will be developed in the near future.

However, there are quite a few tools and methods available to enhance your online privacy and minimize the possibility of identification. Find the most effective methods to protect yourself below. Browsers like Chrome, Edge, Safari, and Firefox allow users to browse in incognito mode. This will greatly reduce your chances of having a unique fingerprint. You can also opt to install plugins that disable trackers, which are employed by certain websites, from running on your browser.

Plugins like AdBlock Plus , Privacy Badger , Disconnect , and NoScript are designed to block scripts that potentially enable spying ads and invisible trackers from running in your browser. For some websites, this means that the user experience might be somewhat less satisfactory. Panopticlick recommends using their Privacy Badger, which is a browser extension that blocks advertisers and other third-party tracking software from tracking your online activities. NoScript requires more time to set up and use effectively because the plugin blocks JavaScript on every website by default.

One of the more effective methods you can use to protect yourself against browser fingerprinting is to disable JavaScript and Flash. This will impact your browsing experience. On the other hand, Flash can be disabled without a negative impact on the user experience. Generally, Flash only impacts the browsing experience when you visit very old websites.

Malwarebytes and HitmanPro are both outstanding anti-malware software tools that run seamlessly alongside your antivirus software and serve as a second layer of protection. In most instances, anti-malware blocks ads, harmful or annoying toolbars, and spyware software that might be running in the background on your system. When you install an anti-malware tool, be smart and go to the settings in order to enable automatic weekly or at least monthly full-system scans.

Additionally, the Tor Browser aggressively blocks JavaScript code on websites. The major downside of using the Tor Browser is the slow browsing speed, and the fact that it only protects the internet traffic sent through the Tor Browser and not others, like Firefox or Chrome. As shown in the image below, a VPN is like a middle man. By doing so, your IP address will be unknown to the webserver.

But, your IP address is only one aspect of your online identity. Used in conjunction with other methods, though, a VPN can be a great asset.